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Abstract. Although the Domain Name System (DNS) was designed as a naming
system, its features have made it appealing to repurpose it for the deployment of
novel systems. One important class of such systems are security enhancements,
and this work sheds light on their deployment. We show the characteristics of
these solutions and measure reliability of DNS in these applications. We investi-
gate the compatibility of these solutions with the Tor network, signal necessary
changes, and report on surprising drawbacks in Tor’s DNS resolution.
1 Introduction
DNS is one of the most successful Internet infrastructures. It is a naming system for
resources over the Internet, and its most prominent use is to translate human-readable
names to IP addresses. Currently, this hierarchical and distributed system is a core in-
frastructure of the Internet, and over the years the availability and reliability of standard
DNS operations have increased [17]. Although DNS is primarily (and was designed as)
a system for name resolution, due to its success and flexibility it is used by various,
not initially intended, applications. One family of such applications are various security
enhancements. These systems are particularly difficult to deploy [16], as different ac-
tors are reluctant to deploy and invest in a security-dedicated infrastructure. Due to low
cost, well-understood operations and administration, and its ubiquity, DNS seems like
an ideal environment to support deployment of new security enhancements. Thus, it is
naturally appealing to protocol designers to repurpose the DNS infrastructure, rather
than designing and deploying a new one. For those reasons, DNS is currently being
employed by various security enhancements. As a consequence, new systems rely on
the infrastructure designed decades ago. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how
robust and applicable the infrastructure is for these use cases. The essence of the new
uses is to transport additional information using DNS, however, there exist indications
that such a transport can be unreliable.
In this work we make the following contributions: 1) investigate the use of DNS-based
security enhancements, 2) study DNS reliability for these applications, 3) check the
compatibility of the enhancements if the DNS resolution occurs over Tor.
2 Background
DNS Resolution is a process of translating human-readable domain names to IP ad-
dresses. It is conducted through the DNS infrastructure, namely DNS clients, resolvers,
and servers. To resolve a domain name, e.g., www.a.com, a client initiates the pro-
cess by querying its resolver, which in turn contacts one of the DNS root servers (root
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servers’ IP addresses are fixed and known to resolvers). The root server returns an ad-
dress of a DNS authoritative server for the com domain. Then, the resolver queries
the com authoritative server to find an authoritative server for a.com, which finally is
queried about www.a.com. The a.com authoritative server returns the IP address(es) of
www.a.com. The lengthy resolution process is usually shortcut by using cached infor-
mation.
DNS allows to associate various information with domain names. Information is
encoded and delivered within resource records (RRs) with dedicated types, e.g., A and
AAAA RRs map domain names to IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, respectively, NS RRs indicate
authoritative servers, while TXT RRs can associate an arbitrary text. DNS responses can
contain multiple RRs of the queried type. It is also possible to translate IP addresses
into domain names (to this end PTR RRs are used).
DNS deploys UDP as a default transport protocol, however, for responses larger
than 512 bytes a failover mechanism is introduced. Larger responses are truncated to fit
512 bytes and marked by a truncated flag. Resolvers receiving a truncated response
query the server again via TCP to obtain the complete response. (Clients can increase
the limit by signaling the maximum UDP response size they can handle [18].)
DNS Resolution (Un)Reliability. Although DNS is reliable for its major application
(i.e., translating names to IP addresses), the reliability for other applications is ques-
tionable. For instance, many of DNS clients, resolvers, and servers are realized as
non-compliant implementations [3]. It was reported [9] that a significant fraction of all
clients (2.6%) and a large fraction of resolvers (17%) cannot perform the UDP-to-TCP
failover. This behavior limits clients ability to receive responses larger than 512 bytes.
Another potential issue [3] is caused by network environments, where devices can han-
dle only unusually small Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) packets, thus introducing
IP fragmentation decreasing the reliability of the DNS resolution. DNS traffic is also a
subject to traffic analysis, and some middleboxes manipulate DNS responses [7, 19]. It
is believed that some non-standard RRs are discriminated by non-compliant implemen-
tations or/and network devices. For instance, some experiments [12, 19] indicate that A
RRs are more reliable than TXT RRs.
3 Security Enhancements Employing DNS
We focus our study on two families of security enhancements that can benefit from a
robust DNS infrastructure, namely email and TLS PKI enhancements. The main reason
why DNS infrastructure can be appealing for these technologies is that both email and
TLS PKI are domain based. As the DNS lookup usually precedes the email exchange or
TLS connection establishment, the client can obtain some relevant information before
the connection setup. Additionally, such DNS-based information pre-fetching does not
violate the privacy, as no additional third party is contacted (DNS servers are contacted
anyways). A security assumption for these schemes is that an adversary cannot control
DNS entries of targeted domains.
3.1 Email
SPF [10] enables domains to make assertions (in DNS) about hosts that are authorized
to originate email for that domain. When an email is received by an email exchanger,
it parses the domain name from the email’s From address field, and queries the DNS to
check whether the sender is authorized to send email. This mitigates spam and phishing
emails that abuse the From field. SPF mainly uses TXT RRs, although a dedicated SPF
RR was introduced.
Sender ID [1] is an anti-spoofing proposal based on SPF. The main difference is that
it aims in verifying the sender address displayed to an email client (the From field and
the address displayed by email clients can differ). Such an address is introduced as a
Purported Responsible Address (PRA) [15]. By setting a special TXT or SPF record, a
domain can specify if only SPF should be verified, or both SPF and PRA, or PRA only.
DKIM [4] is an email authentication protocol based on signatures. A domain publishes
RR with its public key. Next, the domain’s outbound email server signs sent emails
with the corresponding private key. An inbound email server, after receiving a signed
email, extracts its origin domain name (via the From field) and performs a DNS lookup
to obtain the domain’s public key used to verify the email. Usually, DKIM is executed
by email servers rather than email clients (i.e., authors and recipients). Public keys are
stored in TXT RRs, and to obtain a key of a.com, dkim.a.com is queried. DKIM
protects emails from modification, however, the scheme can be bypassed by an active
adversary by simply stripping the DKIM headers.
DMARC [11] is a comprehensive system that allows an email-originating organiza-
tion to express domain-level policies for email management. A policy can specify how
emails should be validated and how receivers should handle validation failures. Addi-
tionally, DMARC policies can be used to implement a reporting system (i.e., to report
on actions performed under a policy). DMARC deploys SPF and DKIM, and domain
owners can specify which of those mechanisms (or both) should be used to validate
their emails. DMARC uses TXT RRs to store policies, and the RRs are associated with
domain names prepended with the dmarc. prefix, e.g., dmarc.a.com.
3.2 TLS PKI Enhancement
DANE [8] allows domains to specify their key(s) or key(s) of Certificate Authorities
(CAs) they trust. To this end, a domain publishes a special DNS entry with its public
key(s) or public key(s) of trusted CA(s). DANE introduces a new TLSA RR. The scheme
relies on DNSSEC, requiring that the RRs be signed with the domain’s DNSSEC key.
DANE records are created per service, thus a DANE query encodes a transport protocol,
and a port number used. For instance, keys of a HTTPS server running at www.a.com
can be checked by querying 443. tcp.www.a.com. Such a flexible mechanism allows
to use DANE for all services that deploy TLS.
CAA [6] aims to provide trust agility and remove a single point of failure from the
TLS PKI. Specifically, it allows a domain to specify (in DNS) CA(s) authorized to issue
certificates for the domain. This simple procedure can prevent the two following threats:
(i) compromised CA: a CA that is not listed by a domain cannot issue a valid certificate
for the domain, (ii) identity spoofing: a benign CA can refuse certificate issuance if it
is not listed by the domain. CAA introduces new CAA RRs, which do not have to be
protected via DNSSEC, although it is recommended.
Log-based approaches are recent PKI enhancements that introduce publicly-verifiable
logs. The most prominent example is CT [13], whose goal is to make all certificates
issued by CAs visible. To this end, every certificate is submitted to a log, which returns
a signed promise that the certificate will be logged. Then, in every TLS connection
a client receives a certificate accompanied with the logging promise. However, it is
important to verify whether the promise was met, and to do so the client has to obtain
a proof from the log that given certificate indeed was logged. Laurie et al. propose [14]
that clients ask a special CT-supported DNS server for such a proof. An advantage of
this scheme is that DNS requests are sent via a local resolver, thus the CT DNS server
(and the log) cannot identify the client, but only his resolver (usually run by his ISP).
4 Current State of Deployment
First, we investigate deployment characteristics of the enhancements. In particular, we
focus on factors that can influence reliability of DNS as a transport (i.e., RRs used and
response sizes). To this end, we conduct a measurement of the hundred thousand most
popular domains of the Internet (according to the Alexa list: http://www.alexa.
com/topsites). For each domain name we queried for RRs that implement a given
functionality. We queried for DANE’s RRs specific to HTTPS, i.e., 443. tcp., and
443. tcp.www. prepended to a queried domain name. We omitted log-based mecha-
nism, as no scheme is combined with DNS yet (up to our knowledge).
RR(s) Successful Response Size (B)
Mechanism Queried Responses min med avg max
SPF TXT 53365 (53.37%) 25 148 185 3138
SPF 4182 (4.18%) 27 122 144 1606
Sender ID TXT 1766 (1.77%) 56 303 333 1285
SPF 98 (0.10%) 79 234 247 538
DKIM TXT 5049 (5.05%) 49 64 97 1007
DMARC TXT 7361 (7.36%) 35 133 140 1003
DANE TLSA 48 (0.05%) 80 88 96 182
CAA CAA 15 (0.02%) 58 106 106 269
Table 1: Measured scale of deployment and response sizes.
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Fig. 1: CDF of the measured response sizes.
Table 1 presents the measured scale of deployment with the response size charac-
teristics, while Figure 1 presents a CDF of the measured response sizes. As depicted,
TXT RRs dominate, constituting about 94% of all successful responses. It is mainly due
to well-established deployment of the mail enhancements (SPF mainly). Although, new
RR types (like SPF) were introduced, the operators clearly prefer to rely on older TXT
RRs. PKI enhancements do not have significant deployment, which is probably caused
by their relative immaturity (e.g., SPF was introduced in 2006, while DANE and CAA
in 2012 and 2013, respectively). Another finding is that most of the responses fit the
limit of 512 bytes. An exception are responses including Sender ID’s data (approxi-
mately 15% of them exceed the limit).
5 Reliability of DNS
To investigate how reliable DNS is for the security enhancements, we conducted a series
of experiments using RIPE Atlas (https://atlas.ripe.net/), the largest publicly
available global testbed for network measurements. RIPE Atlas is a network of hard-
ware devices, called probes, used for active Internet measurements. It supports DNS
measurements, and provides good geographic coverage [2]. Through the measurements
we wanted to answer the two following questions:
1. Are TXTRRs discriminated (dropped or manipulated) by some DNS clients/resolvers
or network devices?
2. How reliable is DNS in transporting UDP responses larger than 512 bytes?
The first question is motivated by the importance of TXT RRs (see §3) and by the com-
mon belief that a significant fraction of TXT RRs is not transported correctly (probably
due to its non-standard type). We investigate the second question to verify how the 512
bytes limit for UDP DNS responses is enforced by the DNS infrastructure. This ques-
tion is important as the previous work indicates that the TCP support at DNS resolvers
is incomplete [9], thus it is risky to rely on the failover mechanism. (Note, that RIPE At-
las does not expose an option to check whether a probe’s DNS client/resolver correctly
handles responses with the truncated flag set.)
In order to conduct the measurements, we launched an authoritative DNS server,
and prepared it with DNS responses of the following sizes:
494 bytes : the size is below the 512 bytes limit, but it can handle most of the current
responses (see Figure 1). We investigated transport over A and TXT RRs, to verify
whether TXT RRs are discriminated (while compared to A RRs).
1005 bytes : responses with this size allow us to investigate how robust the DNS infras-
tructure is, when the UDP response size limit is exceeded. This size is also below
the standard MTUs (i.e., about 1500 bytes).
1997 bytes : by responses with this size, we want to investigate how exceeding the
standard MTU influences DNS transport.
Our DNS server was configured not to set the truncated flag, and in the RIPE
Atlas setting we set the acceptable response size to 4096 bytes. We scheduled measure-
ments on the RIPE Atlas at the end of August 2016. We assigned all 9270 connected
probes to query our DNS server. For response sizes of 1005 and 1997 bytes we investi-
gated only TXT RRs. Depending on the queried target, the following number of probes
have responded: 8952 for queried A and TXT RRs sent in 494 bytes responses, 8934 for
1005 bytes responses, and 7990 for 1997 bytes responses. Note, that each probe could
respond with multiple DNS responses.
In Table 2 we present the obtained results. As probes can use the same, popular
resolvers, beside the absolute number of responses, we also present results for unique
resolutions, where a unique resolution is defined as a triple: number of RRs within
a response, response size, and resolver’s address. The successful results are divided
into responses that were received with the exact size served (by the authoritative DNS
server), and larger responses (resolvers add other information that is relevant to the
Successful Resolutions Failed Resolutions
Test Total Total Exact Larger Total Error Empty Truncated
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A 16570 15468 15356 112 1102 867 189 46
494B 100% 93.35% 92.67% 0.68% 6.65% 5.23% 1.14% 0.28%
TXT 16570 15460 15343 117 1110 892 206 12
494B 100% 93.30% 92.60% 0.71% 6.70% 5.38% 1.24% 0.07%
TXT 16553 13480 936 12544 3073 1504 1155 414
1005B 100% 81.44% 5.65% 75.78% 18.56% 9.09% 6.98% 2.50%
TXT 13727 7286 29 7257 6441 2360 3617 464
1997B 100% 53.08% 0.21% 52.87% 46.92% 17.19% 26.35% 3.38%
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A 7452 6625 6526 99 827 633 166 28
494B 100% 88.90% 87.57% 1.33% 11.10% 8.49% 2.23% 0.38%
TXT 7447 6618 6516 102 829 638 181 10
494B 100% 88.87% 87.50% 1.37% 11.13% 8.57% 2.43% 0.13%
TXT 7938 6222 450 5772 1716 922 636 158
1005B 100% 78.38% 5.67% 72.71% 21.62% 11.62% 8.01% 1.99%
TXT 6887 3741 19 3722 3146 1252 1652 242
1997B 100% 54.32% 0.28% 54.04% 45.68% 18.18% 23.99% 3.51%
Table 2: Measured reliability of DNS.
query, like addresses of authoritative servers). Failed resolutions are divided into three
categories. First, the fraction of resolution errors is presented. These are errors such
as a DNS resolver that could not be found, or a failed connection. Then, we present
empty DNS responses (i.e., number of answers equals zero). The last category shows the
number of truncated responses, i.e., responses with fewer number of RRs than expected
or/and shorter payload of the response.
Our first observation is that for the 494 bytes long responses there is only a neg-
ligible difference between reliability of A-only responses versus TXT-only responses.
Secondly, the results show that UDP responses with size above the 512 bytes limit
increase the failure rate from 6.70% to 18.56% (all responses) and from 11.13% to
21.62% (unique responses). Taking into consideration the results about failing TCP
support, it might be more effective to use UDP with increased size instead of TCP.
Lastly, the largest responses investigated (1997 bytes) are successfully delivered only
in about 50% of all cases. That is probably caused by MTU issues, as common MTUs
over the Internet are about 1500 bytes. We also observe, that resolvers enlarge responses
usually when they are large already.
Although RIPE Atlas is an ideal open testbed for such tests, it introduces some bi-
ases. Probes are plug-and-forget devices, thus an owner may be not aware that DNS
resolution at his/her probe does not work properly (this could explain the large frac-
tion of DNS errors even for the smallest responses investigated). Moreover, probes are
usually installed by network-savvy users like research institutions, Internet operators,
hobbyists, and the probe distribution (based on their ASes) is heavy-tailed [2].
6 Tor and Security Enhancements
Tor [5] is the most popular software and infrastructure for enabling anonymous commu-
nication over the Internet. It is an onion routing protocol, where an encryption circuit
is selected by the Tor client software. DNS querying over Tor is also anonymous and
conducted by an exit node of the circuit (this node will forward traffic to destinations).
The DNS resolution in Tor is restricted only to A, AAAA, and PTR RRs. This ob-
viously limits the deployment of DNS-supported security enhancements in Tor. It is
especially important for the PKI enhancements, as they assume clients to participate in
the protocol (the mail enhancements are deployed mainly by the mail infrastructure).
In this section, we investigate whether the supported RRs can be used to implement
DNS-supported enhancements (for instance, one could convey information on a series
of A or AAAA RRs). We measured DNS resolution over Tor, using our authoritative
server, that was also configured as a Tor Linux client (i.e., the server queried itself
through the Tor network, as presented in Figure 2). For every set of queries, a new Tor
circuit was selected, and we conducted 15000 such resolutions. We investigated how
reliable Tor is in resolving requests for the supported RRs (i.e., A, AAAA, and PTR). We
checked PTR queries for both, IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
DNS
Server
Entry
Node
Middle
Node
Exit
Node
Anonymity Network
encrypted
DNS query
Fig. 2: Tor-based measurement scenario.
A PTR (IPv4) PTR (IPv6) AAAA
99.78% 99.22% 98.89% 23.05%
Table 3: Fraction of successful resolutions
(i.e., single RR returned) depending on type.
The first observation is that all asked re-
solvers limited DNS responses only to a sin-
gle RR. This limits ways the supported RRs
can be used to encode some additional data
(e.g., single A query can return only four
bytes). Table 3 presents the fraction of suc-
cessfully resolved requests. As depicted, A
queries are resolved slightly more reliably
than PTR queries for IPv4 addresses, which in
turn are less reliable for IPv6 addresses. The
results also show, that although AAAA RRs are
supported, they are resolved correctly only
for 23% of requests (probably, only nodes
supporting IPv6 resolve them).
Surprisingly, we observed that some resolvers fail to return any response when the
response from the authoritative server is large (but still below 512 bytes). To further
investigate this phenomena, we prepared responses with A RRs with different sizes.
We then measured when requests are processed successfully (by success we mean a
response to the client that contains a single RR, although many were served). The results
(see Table 4) show that reliability of DNS resolution decreases with the response size.
Only 38% of all resolutions succeeded at all with 494 bytes long responses served.
7 Conclusions
Our study confirms that DNS-based security enhancements should respect the conser-
vative limit of 512 bytes for responses, as robustness of DNS transport can be influenced
by many uncontrollable factors. Fortunately, the limit is sufficient for about 95% of all
61B 110B 158B 254B 366B 398B 430B 462B 478B 494B
1 RRs 4 RRs 7 RRs 13 RRs 20 RRs 22 RRs 24 RRs 26 RRs 27 RRs 28 RRs
99.77% 99.77% 99.77% 99.77% 99.23% 99.16% 98.10% 92.87% 91.27% 38.36%
Table 4: Fraction of successful resolutions (i.e., single A RR returned) depending on the response
size (from the authoritative server).
received responses. However, our study does not confirm the common belief that TXT
RRs are being discriminated. Our work identifies DNS resolution in Tor as an interest-
ing subject for future work, as we found it surprising and inconsistent: resolvers fail
to return large responses, slightly differently handle PTR RRs for IPv4 and IPv6 ad-
dresses, AAAA RRs are officially supported, but in practice are resolved only by 23%
of all resolvers. We also observe that restricting other RRs (especially PKI-related, like
TLSA) will actually decrease security of end users. Hence, to fulfill Tor’s mission (i.e.,
“to allow people to improve their privacy and security on the Internet”) the developers
should consider supporting DNS-based security enhancements.
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